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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, STATIC 
EFFICIENCY, AND 1HE GOALS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
MATTHEW D. AnLER* 
Abstract: The Essay suggests that environmental law may properly be 
sensitive to nonwelfarist and distributive considerations as well as overall 
human welfare. It summarizes the author's revisionary view of eBA as a 
decision-procedure roughly tracking overall welfare that incorporates 
an objectivist rather than preferentialist view of well-being, and that has 
a role to play even within a non utilitarian of moral framework. And it 
explains that eBA does not (pace Driesen) involve a static conception 
of efficiency, a presupposition that technological change is exogeneous, 
or an assumption that individuals act rationally. 
I. CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND "STATIC EFFICIENCY" 
Many thanks to David Driesen for organizing this conference, and 
for inviting me to participate. I should stress at the outset that I'm basi-
cally an applied philosopher, not an economist or a scientist. I'm inter-
ested in the application of moral philosophy to problems of public law, 
not only constitutional law but also administrative law and regulation, 
which have been relatively underexamined by philosophers. I've writ-
ten, in particular, about the normative foundations of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA). This is my work with Eric Posner,! and also some sole-
authored work.2 I'm not by any means an expert in environmental 
law-I've never written about it specifically, or even taught it-and so 
much of what I say over the next few days will be tentative. 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
I Matthew D. Adler & Eric A Posner, Implementing Cost.Benefit Analysis When Preferences 
Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STIJD. 1105 (2000) [hereinafter Adler & Posner, Implementing 
CBA]; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE LJ. 165 
(1999) [hereinafter Adler & Posner, Rethinking CBA]. 
2 Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 241 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, Beyond Efficiency]; Matthew D. Adler, Fear 
Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
(forthcoming 2004); Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1371 (1998); Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of 
Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293 (2003). 
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What I'll try to do in these corrunents is say something about 
CBA, as I understand it, and so at various points during the conversa-
tion you may hear me respond to criticisms of CBA by saying: "Well, 
that may be a valid criticism of CBA as traditionally understood, but it 
doesn't apply to CBA as correctly understood." 
The traditional view of CBA says a couple of things.3 The tradi-
tional cost-benefit test is the sum of compensating variations. Imagine 
two outcomes, a status quo outcome and a project outcome. For any 
given person, her compensating variation is the amount of money, 
added to or subtracted from her resources in the project world, such 
that she is now indifferent between the two outcomes. She neither 
prefers the status quo world to the amended project world, nor vice 
versa. The traditional cost-benefit test says to aggregate these compen-
sating variations across the population. If the sum is positive, then the 
project should be chosen over the status quo. If the sum is negative, 
then the status quo should be chosen. 
The traditional view defends this test through some controversial 
normative commitments. First, the view adopts a preferentialist ac-
count of human welfare.4 It says that some person is better off with 
one outcome, as opposed to another outcome, just because he prefers 
the first outcome. It's the preferentialist account of welfare that ex-
plains why compensating variations are defined in terms of prefer-
ences. Second, CBA traditionally understood is committed to Kal-
dor-Hicks efficiency as a bedrock moral criterion.!> One outcome is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to a second outcome just in case 
there's, hypothetically, a redistribution of resources, from those who 
are better off in the first outcome to those who are worse off, that 
makes everyone better off. The traditional view of CBA says that Kal-
dor-Hicks efficiency has fundamental moral significance; and the sum 
of compensating variations test is seen as equivalent, or at least 
roughly equivalent, to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
I reject the traditional defense of CBA in several importan t ways. 
First, I deny that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has any foundational moral 
significance. We can talk more about this during the conversation if you 
like, but suffice it to say that Ronald Dworkin, Jules Coleman, and oth-
ers, responding to Richard Posner's efforts on behalf of Kaldor-Hicks 
3 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking CBA, supra note 1, at 176-94. 
4 See id. at 197-204. 
5 See id. at 190-91. 
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efficiency, provided devastating critiques more than twenty years ago.6 I 
link CBA not to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, but to overall well-being.' To 
see the difference, consider that a transfer of wealth from rich to poor 
is not going to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, or pass a cost-benefit test tradi-
tionally understood, but it will increase overall well-being assuming 
that-as seems quite plausible-money has diminishing marginal util-
ity. In any event, I believe it is overall well-being, not Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency, that provides the moral bedrock for CBA. My claim is not 
that overall well-being has conclusive moral significance, but rather that 
it has prima facie moral significance. If you think that overall well-being 
has conclusive moral significance-that nothing other than overall well-
being matters morally-then you're a utilitarian. Utilitarianism is one 
way to incorporate overall well-being within your moral theory, but not 
the only way. For example, you might have a mixed theory that incor-
porates a plurality of moral factors, including overall well-being, dis-
tributive criteria, perfectionist values that have no link to welfare-for 
example, aesthetic or environmental values-and deontological rights. 
Within this sort of pluralist theory, overall well-being has some weight-
simply not overriding weight. 
Note that claims about overall well-being assume the possibility of 
interpersonal welfare comparisons. I think those are possible, as at least 
some in the economics and philosophy literatures have thought-for 
example John Harsanyi, whose account of interpersonal comparisons 
is, I think, quite close to the mark.s 
So one way I depart from the tradition is by linking CBA to over-
all well-being, not Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. The other way is by aban-
doning the preferentialist view of welfare that has been standard, and 
instead-this is my current thinking-adopting an objective view of 
welfare. Objectivism says that people are better off not in virtue of sat-
isfYing their preferences, but in virtue of realizing various objective 
goods: for example, life, bodily health, bodily integrity, the use of the 
senses, imagination and thought, the emotions, practical reason, 
affiliation, interaction with other species, play, and control over one's 
environment. That's Martha Nussbaum's list, which I find fairly plau-
sible.9 Objective goods, more formally, are not things that people ac-
6 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 509 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value~, 9 J. LEGAL STIJD. 191 (1980). 
7 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking CBA, supra note 1, at 204-16. 
8 See id. at 206-08. 
9 MARTIIA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES AP-
PROACH 78-80 (2000). 
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tually prefer. Rather, they're things that people ideally would prefer-
if given full information, if they deliberated fully, and so on-or more 
precisely would prompt convergence of idealized preferences. lO 
Tying CBA to an objectivist rather than preferentialist account of 
welfare is less loony than you might think. IT you look at actual adminis-
trative practice, agencies engaged in CBA reject preferences they think 
are distorted. For example, they don't count the satisfaction of sadistic 
preferences, homophobic preferences, racist preferences, or-in gen-
eral-disinterested preferences that are motivated by political views 
rather than by a real welfare effect on the subject as benefits. ll So 
there's a covert objectivism going on here in actual agency practice. 
Thus far I've talked about how my understanding of the moral 
backdrop for CBA differs from the standard view. I also, relate diy, have 
a different understanding of the test itself. Traditionally, again, the CBA 
test is the sum of compensating variations. The better test, I suggest, is 
the sum of welfare equivalents. Given two outcomes, a status quo and a 
project, a person's welfare equivalent is the amount of money such that, 
added to or subtracted from his resources in the project world, he is 
just as well off in both worlds-given the objective goods he realizes in 
both worlds.l2 In effect, the notion of a welfare equivalent allows agen-
cies to reject a person's expressed or revealed willingness-to-pay as 
reflecting a distorted preference-a preference that doesn't really track 
what's good for her. To be sure, this override power needs to be exer-
cised cautiously, since people are often the best judges of their own wel-
fare. To put the point another way, revealed or expressed willingness-to-
pay is often the best evidence of someone's welfare equivalent. But still, 
the fundamental CBA test, in my view, is the sum of welfare equivalents, 
not the sum of willingness-to-pay. 
And I understand this test as a procedure by which government 
implements the underlying criterion of overall well-being. Insofar as 
the underlying moral view is a pluralist view, such that overall welfare 
is one moral criterion among several, it's a mistake to think of CBA as 
a complete governmental choice-procedure.13 It would, in that case, 
simply be one part of the complete procedure. For example, imagine 
that you're a deep ecologist who thinks that two criteria are morally 
relevant to governmental choice: overall well-being, and the preserva-
tion of ecosystems and species quite apart from the effect of that on 
10 See Adler, Beyond Efficiency, supra note 2, at 297-302. 
11 See Adler & Posner, Implementing CBA, supra note 1, at 1116-25. 
12 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking CBA, supra note 1, at 220-21. 
\3 See id. at 243-45. 
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welfare. Given this view, for environmental agencies to rely upon CBA 
as their exclusive decision making procedure would be a mistake. 
Rather, CBA simply indicates the goodness of agency choices with re-
spect to overall welfare. Imagine an agency decision of some kind that 
moderately decreases long-run overall welfare, but has a large effect 
in preventing the degradation of ecosystems. If the environment has 
intrinsic, nonwelfarist value, then the agency could be justified in un-
dertaking the decision, all things considered, even though it de-
creases welfare. But CBA would point the other way. CBA tracks over-
all welfare, but perhaps not the totality of moral considerations 
relevant to the government. I'll say more on this point in Part II. 
A final foundational point, related to this view of CBA as a deci-
sion procedure: CBA does not perfectly track overall well-being. The 
problem, going back to a point I made in criticizing the foundational 
view of Kaldor-Hicks, is that money has variable interpersonal utility. 
Money is an imperfect, not a perfect, measure of the effect of a gov-
ernmental choice on someone's welfare. One can imagine a decision-
procedure where welfare changes are measured in "utiles" rather than 
dollars. The problem with this sort of procedure is, in effect, the 
bounded rationality and limited information of governmental deci-
sionmakers and other humans. Given our familiarity with dollars, 
measuring welfare changes in dollar terms is a lot easier for us than 
measuring them in utility terms. Further, many, many goods and ser-
vices are traded on markets. Market prices are some evidence, al-
though certainly not perfect evidence, of welfare equivalents. We 
need to be careful about externalities and about distorted prefer-
ences, both of which might prompt a divergence between market 
prices and welfare equivalents. Still, at least for now, CBA seems like a 
much more feasible welfarist decision-procedure than a procedure 
calibrated in interpersonal utility units}4 
I've spent a fair bit of time on foundations, but I think that it's 
important to be clear on what, I think, the best general understand-
ing of CBA is, before we plunge into environmental law. To sum up: 
the CBA test is the sum of welfare equivalents, itself a rough, not per-
fect, guide for identifYing whether agency choice increases or de-
crease overall well-being, which in turn has prima facie, not necessar-
ily conclusive, moral significance. 
Let me shift now to static efficiency. CBA, as I understand it, is 
not a particularly static test. First, CBA can, and is all the time, used to 
14 See id. at 216-43. 
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analyze choices with in tertemporal welfare implications. The welfare 
setbacks and benefits can occur in the future, perhaps in the distant 
future. For example, cleaning up a waste dump might impose costs 
now on the dump's owners, but prevent cancer deaths that would 
otherwise occur years or decades from now. That temporally remote 
welfare benefit certainly does count as a benefit for CBA purposes. It 
would be reflected in a positive, not zero, welfare equivalent to clean 
up the dump, among nearby residents, none of whom may gain an 
immediate benefit from the cleanup. To be sure, pricing remote costs 
and benefits raises the question of the discount rate-which is a cru-
cial technical question for CBA, one that we may want to talk about 
this weekend-but any notion that CBA is limited to considering the 
short-term, rather than intermediate- or long-term effects of govern-
mental choices, is mistaken. 
Second, CBA is not committed to "static efficiency" as David Drie-
sen defines it. 15 He writes: "I refer to efficiency concepts that assume an 
unchanging technological state as static efficiency concepts. "16 There is 
nothing in CBA, certainly not as I have defined it, namely as the sum of 
welfare equivalents, nor for that matter as it's traditionally defined, 
namely as the sum of compensating variations, that assumes an un-
changing technological state. Let me repeat, because I am sure this will 
be a contested point in the discussion. There is nothing in CBA that 
assumes an unchanging technological state. Perhaps that assumption is 
a useful heuristic given the bounded rationality of CBA analysts, but if 
the heuristic is seriously misguided then it should be rejected. Imagine 
that requiring factories to remove some toxin from their waste streams 
would save ten lives a year. Imagine that compliance costs in year one, 
given technology available in year one, are $100 million. But the re-
quirement would induce the factories to pursue environmental innova-
tions, or so regulators predict based on past experience. After five 
years, let us imagine, annual compliance costs can be predicted to drop 
to $10 million. A static-efficiency analysis would assume that the current 
compliance costs continue indefinitely-in which case the regulatory 
requirement looks like a net loss, assuming a value of $6 million per life 
saved. But a proper CBA wouldn't assume that current compliance costs 
continue indefinitely. Instead, the correct CBA would say that benefits 
in years one through five are $60 million, costs are $100 million, while 
15 David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REv. 501, 508 (2004). 
16Id. 
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benefits in years six though infinity are $60 million, and costs are $10 
million-in which case, depending on the discount rate, the regulatory 
requirement might well pass a cost-benefit test. There is just nothing in 
CBA, as I have defined it, or as it's traditionally defined, that requires 
the analyst to assume that compliance costs in future years would equal 
compliance costs in the first year of a regulation, or more generally to 
assume an unchanging technological state. I haven't checked through 
regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) on this point-my interest lies much 
more in the pricing of nonmarket goods than in the measurement of 
compliance costs-but I'd be astonished if there weren't RIAs where 
agencies indeed posited intertemporally variable compliance costs. 
I should emphasize that I'm quarreling with David Driesen here 
about the definition of CBA. He assumes it to be a much more static 
methodology than it is. I'm not quarreling with him about the nature 
of environmental innovation. This is an area where I have zero exper-
tise, and am therefore agnostic. David in his handout and in his book 
makes a number of claims about the way in which regulation spurs 
innovation that strike me as plausible. For example, stringent regula-
tion produces more innovation than laxer regulationP Relatedly, 
"emissions trading probably weakens net incentives for innovation," 
because it diminishes innovation incentives for high-cost firms more 
than it increases innovation incentives for low-cost firms. IS More gen-
erally, past estimates of the costliness of pollution controls have often 
been overstated. They have been overstated by firms, which have an 
incentive to overstate them to resist governmental regulation, and by 
economists and government analysts, who have failed to realize that 
technological change is endogenous, not exogenous, to govern men tal 
regulation. Imposition of an antipollution regulation itself, often, in-
duces qualitative improvements in environmental technology 
sufficient to make the regulation cost-effective. These claims may well 
be true. I'm not going to speak to them here. What I am trying to un-
derline is this: nothing in my commitment to CBA compels me to 
think that the claims are false. David's claims about the effect of pol-
lution regulation on environmental innovation are, in effect, broad, 
empirical claims about the endogeneity and time path of compliance 
costs, which if true should be incorporated within sophisticated CBA 
by environmental agencies. 
17 Id. at 527-28. 
18 Id. at 519-20. 
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Similarly, I should emphasize, CBA does not involve an a priori 
commitment to particular regulatory techniques. Simplistically, let's dis-
tinguish between traditional command-and-control regulation, where 
polluters are instructed to adopt particular technologies (scrubbers, 
say); performance standards, where polluters are instructed to meet 
certain pollution goals (emissions of chemical Ymay not exceed X tons 
per year); and market-mimicking schemes, such as pollution taxes or 
tradable emissions permits. Believing in CBA as an analytic tool for 
governmental choice doesn't necessarily mean believing in market-
mimicking regulatory schemes, as opposed to technological standards 
or non tradable performance requirements. Which is best is strictly an 
empirical question. For example, if the regulatory agency is deciding 
between implementing a given reduction in emissions through non-
tradable performance requirements versus tradable rights, and the 
CBA analyst believes, a la Driesen, that compliance costs will fall more 
quickly with a scheme of non tradable performance requirements, then 
the analyst will conclude that the scheme of non tradable requirements 
has greater net benefits, relative to the status quo, than the tradable 
rights-and therefore that a proper CBA, in this instance, opposes 
tradable rights. 
There is an analogy, here, to the debate within law and econom-
ics about rules versus standards. Legal requirements might be formu-
lated in a precise, rule-like way. "Don't go more than sixty miles per 
hour." "Put air bags or seat belts in your car." "Don't provide legal ad-
vice for money unless you've gone to law school for three years and 
passed the bar." Or, the law might be formulated using more open-
ended, fuzzy standards. "Exercise due care." "Undertake good faith 
efforts to mitigate damages." "Avoid the appearance of impropriety." 
Rules are overinclusive and underinclusive, but are easier for actors to 
correctly and credibly comply with than standards; compliance with 
standards is more difficult to monitor; even well-meaning actors may 
apply them incorrectly; and they're less successful in engendering re-
liance than rules. In some contexts, rules maximize welfare, as com-
pared to standards; in other contexts, standards maximize overall wel-
fare. Good law and economists are agnostic as between the two. Good 
law and economists are agnostic as between rules and standards even 
though they're committed to overall well-being or its poor relation, 
namely Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Overall well-being is an evaluative cri-
terion; by contrast, the rules-standards debate is a debate about regu-
latory form. Analogously, CBA is an evaluative procedure, a method-
ology by which agencies can evaluate rules and other choices; by 
contrast, the debate about command-and-control regulation versus 
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performance standards versus tradable rights is a debate about regula-
tory form, which the cost-benefit proponent views, or should view, as 
an open, empirical debate. 
A final point along these lines: an underlying theme in David's 
work is bounded rationality. Private individuals are boundedly ra-
tional. They have limited information and, even more damagingly as a 
matter of traditional economic theory, limited conceptual, logical, 
and mathematical abilities. Relate diy, individuals don't maximize ex-
pected utility. Rather, they "satisfice;" they make probability mistakes; 
they exhibit endowment effects; they do, or may do, all the things that 
Herbert Simon, Tversky and Kahneman, and the behavioral econo-
mists and psychologists more generally have led us to expect. 19 And 
insofar as behavioral economics generates better predictions about 
human behavior than traditional rational choice models, CBA needs 
to incorporate the wisdom of behavioral economics. A very simple 
example: if behavioral economics predicts that consumers will fail to 
react to warning labels providing probability information, then a CBA 
of the labels should count them as having zero benefits even though, 
were consumers rational, the labels would have positive benefits. 
To sum up: just as CBA needs to be reconstructed along objectiv-
ist and welfarist, rather than Kaldor-Hicks, lines, so it needs to be dis-
tinguished from certain views that may be held by economists but are 
really no part of CBA: not CBA as I've reconstructed it, and not even 
CBA in the traditional sum of compensating variations form. These 
are claims about the exogeneity and static quality of technology, the 
preferability of market-mimicking regulatory forms, and the confor-
mity of actual human behavior to a rational actor model. CBA, and a 
belief in the moral importance of overall welfare, don't entail any of 
these claims. 
II. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
What do I have to say about the principles that should guide en-
vironmentallaw? Let me try to engage this question at two levels: first, 
at the level of underlying moral principles, rather than at the level of 
the governmental decision-procedures that implement those princi-
ples; and second, at the level of decision-procedures. I'll spend most 
of my time at the first, bedrock level, but will try to finish by looping 
19 See generally REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING (2001). 
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back to the topic of decision-procedures and CBA, which is what I fo-
cused on in Part I. 
Underlying moral principles: in my defense of CBA yesterday, I 
said that CBA was consistent with a wide range of moral views. All that 
was required was that the view give prima facie weight to overall well-
being. One could have a pluralist view, incorporating overall welfare, 
distributive concerns, deontological rights, and environmental or aes-
thetic values detached from welfare. To put the point another way, this 
pluralist moral foundation would have a consequentialist part and a 
nonconsequentialist part. Roughly, consequentialism says: "Achieve 
good outcomes. "20 For example, maximize overall welfare. Or maxi-
mize the equal distribution of welfare. Or, maximize the number of 
species, or the flourishing of ecosystems. By contrast, nonconsequen-
tialists advance putative deontological rules, which actors are suppos-
edly required to follow even though compliance rules might have bad 
consequences.21 The classic example: a deontological or nonconse-
quentialist rule that prohibits the actor from killing someone, even if 
the consequence of the killing would be to prevent five killings. (For 
example, no killing a would-be mass murderer to prevent the killing 
spree he has planned). Another example: a deontological prohibition 
on torture, namely a proscription on performing an act of torture, even 
where that would prevent multiple acts of torture. It is possible to have 
a moral framework that has both consequentialist goals, and deonto-
logical rules, and to see CBA as part of the decision-procedure for im-
plementing the consequentialist goals. 
This kind of moral framework, I think, is mistaken. The belief 
that there are really deontological moral rules is misguided, I now 
think. I don't say this out of a general moral skepticism, since I think 
that some moral norms or criteria really exist. For example, it's really, 
truly morally wrong for government to decrease overall welfare in a 
way that has perverse distributive consequences-by benefiting the 
rich at the expense of the poor-and no environmental benefit. So 
I'm a moral realist. I just now deny that the set of real moral require-
ments includes deontological rules. Deontological rules might be very 
good heuristics; legal rules, as opposed to moral rules, might well be 
deontological in form; there might be good, evolutionary reasons why 
deontological moral beliefs have evolved in human society. But moral-
ity, at the bedrock, is consequentialist in form. Deontological rules 
20 See SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 59-77 (1998). 
21 See Adler, Beyond Efficiency, supra note 2, at 314. 
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invoke a distinction between action and inaction, or between what's 
intentional and what's merely foreseen, that, it seems to me, is morally 
epiphenomenal. Obviously I can't demonstrate to you right now that 
consequentialism is correct-this is the kind of foundational issue 
that philosophers have been debating for millennia-but, ifwe're ar-
ticulating basic principles to guide environmental law, I would start by 
espousing consequentialism. 
I should say that the consequentialism/nonconsequentialism 
choice has real implications for environmental law. Imagine that you 
think people have a deontological right not to be killed. Then that 
might well shape your risk assessment practices. For example, as be-
tween activities that amount to deontological killings-releasing a 
toxic gas into a neighborhood, with immediate toxic effects, a la Bho-
pal-and activities that cause deaths but aren't deontological kill-
ings-selling a dangerous product that many well-informed consum-
ers buy, with many resulting deaths-the deontologist might think 
that government should give priority to preventing the killings. I 
don't. The killing/dying distinction is not, I think, a relevant one for 
environmental policy, although there may well be important distinc-
tions between kinds of deaths. Some deaths are much worse for hu-
man welfare than others. 
Consequentialism, it should be stressed, is a pretty big tent. 
There are welfarist versions and nonwelfarist versions.22 The basic 
idea behind consequentialism, as I've already suggested, is that the 
moral rightness and wrongness of choices reduces to the goodness 
and badness of the outcomes that result from these choices. What 
makes an outcome better or worse? Welfarists say: human welfare, and 
nothing else.23 Nonwelfarists say: it's more complicated. There is 
nothing crazy about nonwelfarist consequentialism, and here I really 
am agnostic. Some of you may know a recent book by Kaplow and 
Shavell, where they argue for welfarism, and suggest that any nonwel-
farist view is just confused, virtually incoherent.24 In particular, the 
fact that a moral view might sometimes rank a Pareto-inferior out-
come over a Pareto-superior outcome is, they think, a reductio ad ab-
surdum of the view.25 I disagree. Nonwelfarist consequentialisms, 
which might sometimes require regulators or other actors to make 
everyone worse off, are, I think, perfectly thinkable moral views. 
22 See id. at 315-17. 
2! See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002). 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 52-58. 
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Imagine that a distant planet has an odd color that spoils our view of 
the night sky. The planet has a flourishing ecosystem: no conscious or 
sentient creatures, just loads of bugs, trees, amoebas, and other non-
sentient creatures interacting. Intuitively, I submit, it would be wrong 
for us to blast the planet out of the night sky, even if it were true, and 
we were sure, that the planet's resources would never be of any use to 
humans and that there would be no other deleterious effects of the 
blasting-say, setting a bad precedent, or making us feel guilty. Now, 
the intuition may be wrong, but at a minimum anyone grappling with 
the foundations of environmental law needs to grapple with the pos-
sibility that ecosystems, species, and other aspects of the environment 
might have intrinsic moral significance-within consequentialism, no 
less. So at this point I'm raising a question rather than offering an an-
swer: is an outcome with a flourishing environment intrinsically bet-
ter, ceteris paribus, than one without, and if so what exactly does a 
flourishing environment mean here? 
It might be objected that the choice between welfarist and nonwel-
farist consequentialism isn't really relevant to environmental policy, 
since environmental degradation always has profound welfare effects, 
particularly once we take into account future generations. Preventing 
the degradation is morally overdetermined; whether or not intrinsic 
environmental values are added to the balance, we should just prevent 
degradation in virtue of the welfare-based reasons for maintaining a 
pristine environment. But of course the claim that the welfare benefits 
of environmental regulation will always justifY the welfare costs isn't 
true at the margin, and invoking costs to future generations raises 
other puzzles--for example, discounting puzzles and nonidentity puz-
zles (whether a policy that changes who exists in the future should be 
seen as having costs or benefits beyond the present generation). 
One point of clarification: nonwelfarist consequentialism doesn't 
deny the moral significance of human welfare. It simply claims that 
other attributes of outcomes are also morally relevant. To flip the 
point around: both welfarist and nonwelfarist consequentialism agree 
that the goodness and badness of outcomes is substantially, if not ex-
clusively, a matter of human welfare. So let me turn to that part of the 
moral bedrock. In the time remaining, let me do two things. First, I'll 
say something about the role of distributive considerations. Second, 
I'll turn to the problem of decision-procedures and our old friend 
CBA. I apologize for the number of topics that I'm trying to cover in a 
quick period, but I'm trying to give you my sense of the overall moral 
terrain as it bears on environmental law. 
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Distributive considerations: to what extent should we be morally 
concerned about the distribution of welfare, rather than merely ag-
gregate welfare?26 Environmental lawyers might think that the choice 
between more versus less egalitarian consequentialisms-like the 
choice between deontology and consequentialism, or the question 
about the intrinsic nonwelfarist value of the environment-doesn't 
have much practical bearing on environmental law. They might think 
that the winners and losers of environmental choices generally have 
the same average wealth or welfare level, so that distributive consid-
erations wash out. Or, they might think-as do some economists-
that distributive considerations are always best handled by the tax sys-
tem. On both counts, I suggest, they may well be wrong. The point of 
the whole environmental justice movement, quite correct, is that 
regulatory choices, including the choice of inaction, by environ-
mental agencies can have welfare effects that are starkly skewed along 
class or racial lines. Relatedly, insofar as environmental choices exac-
erbate inequality by causing death, those distributive consequences 
may be difficult or impossible to reverse through the tax system. If a 
policy of allowing waste dumps to locate in poor neighborhoods 
causes a disproportionate number of cancer deaths among the poor, 
tax subsidies to the deceased won't, even in theory, correct for the 
skew. So again, here, I'm raising an issue rather than arguing for a 
principle: environmental scholars don't, I think, need to grapple with 
the content of de ontological rules, but they do need to grapple with 
the problem of designing environmental law to accommodate both 
considerations of overall welfare and distributive goals. 
Now, there's a simple way to accommodate the two. The simple 
way is to posit a single consequentialist goal that merges utilitarian and 
distributive notions: namely, the goal of aggregate weighted welfare. The 
technical name for this, within philosophy, is prioritarianism.27 We 
measure each person's welfare on an interpersonal utility scale. We 
then multiply that number by a weighting factor which is inversely pro- . 
portional to the level of welfare. And we sum the numbers to deter-
mine how good the outcome is. In other words, prioritarians give 
greater weight to those who are worse off in determining the overall 
goodness of outcomes. The weighting factor might be more or less 
dramatic. Utilitarianism is a limiting case of prioritarianism, where the 
welfare weights are equal across persons. Rawls' maximin is the limiting 
26 See Adler, BeyondEfficiency, supra note 2, at 317-19. 
27 See id. at 309-11. 
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case in the other direction, where welfare gains to the poor take lexical 
priority over losses to the rich.28 Is prioritarianism the right way to inte-
grate utilitarian and distributive concerns within our moral view? IT it is, 
then there's a relatively straightforward way to reconcile equality and 
overall welfare at the level of governmental choice: namely, by using a 
variant of CBA that uses distributive weights, inflating the gains and 
losses of the poor-those whose overall welfare levels are low-and 
deflating the gains and losses of the rich. But it's a hotly contested issue 
within modern philosophical thinking whether prioritarianism really is 
the best way to make sense of our concern for fair distribution. 
So I've ended up, as promised, back at CBA and decision-
procedures. Deontological moral rights have been cleared away. Envi-
ronmental policymakers needn't worry about those. IT, in addition, we 
plump for welfarist consequentialism--concluding that the environ-
ment has no intrinsic value, beyond its importance for human wel-
fare-and for a prioritarian view of fair distribution, then we would be 
inclined to see CBA as a master procedure for governmental choice. 
CBA, with appropriate distributive weights, would then, at least 
roughly, track everything that matters morally. IT, alternatively, the 
moral view is nonwelfarist, or welfarist but not prioritarian, then envi-
ronmental decision makers won't be able to use CBA as their exclusive 
decision procedure. Our enthusiasm for CBA would have to be a bit 
more tempered. 
Two final, crucial caveats: one concerns deliberation costs, the 
other political economy. As for deliberation costs: CBA, itself, is ex-
pensive. So, even just as a matter of implementing overall welfare, it's 
not the case that agencies should always use CBA. This point is re-
flected in the current cost-benefit order, 12,866, which requires full-
blown CBA only for rules, not other decisions, and only for major 
rules (with an economic impact exceeding $100 million).29 How agen-
cies should maximize welfare when, ex ante, the deliberation costs of 
CBA are too high is an excellent question that needs additional work. 
Second, my commitment to CBA is itself, ultimately, empirical 
and contingent. If it could be demonstrated that, given the abilities 
and biases of governmental regulators, the information available to 
them, and the political environment in which they operate, some 
mechanism other than CBA better sorted between welfare-enhancing 
and welfare-reducing rules, I'd gladly change my stripes. This mecha-
28 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
29 Exec. Order No. 12,866,58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30,1993). 
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nism could be an analytic technique, for example, asking regulators 
to measure projects in interpersonal utility terms not dollar terms, or 
an institutional design, for example, substituting reg-neg for CBA. I'd 
ask anyone who shares my view that overall welfare has moral 
significance, but is skeptical about CBA, to offer a concrete alternative 
for implementing that criterion. Show me the better, welfare-
maximizing mousetrap, and I'll buy it. So far, I haven't seen it. 

